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I. WHAT IS CARBON TRADING 
Carbon trading is the buying and selling of a new, 
artificially-created commodity – the right to emit carbon 
dioxide. Unlike trading in other commodities like crude oil 
or bananas, carbon trading is not a voluntary exchange 
between producers and those who want to consume or sell 
on the goods. Instead, it results from action by governments 
to create this new commodity – the right to emit carbon – 
and then to limit the availability of this right in order to 
create scarcity and therefore a market for it. 
Carbon trading is one of a number of different approaches 
that have been developed and adopted by governments as a 
means of controlling the amount of carbon dioxide that is 
emitted into the atmosphere and reducing this amount over 
time. It is based on the broader approach, purportedly to 
control the emission of pollutants, known as ‘cap and trade’. 
Cap and trade is often referred to as a market-based 
mechanism and contrasted with a different set of tools 
available to governments to influence behaviours, those 
which come under the umbrella of direct regulation or 
standard setting. However, this contrasting of market-based 
and non-market-based approach is sometimes unhelpful. It 
ignores the fact that market mechanisms do not operate in a 
vacuum. Instead, they always take place in a social and 
economic environment underpinned by various government 
laws and regulations and often require these laws in order to 
be effective. Carbon trading is a case in point. Carbon 
markets are directly created by government regulation.  
Perhaps a more useful distinction for the purposes of this 
report is that between direct and indirect mechanisms. 
Carbon trading can be classed as an indirect tool as it is 
supposed to achieve its purpose of reducing emissions 
indirectly by affecting the price of those emissions. This in 
turn affects the behaviour of ‘actors’ in the market, i.e. 
those responsible for producing the emissions, by creating 
an incentive for them to save money by reducing their 
emissions and hence change their behaviour. In contrast, 
government regulation and standard setting are direct 
interventions to change behaviour, not reliant on 
intermediate mechanisms such as prices. Taxation is an 
indirect mechanism as it aims to change behaviour through 
affecting the price of a good, service or activity. However, it 
is arguably less indirect than trading as governments fix the 
price with a tax whereas with trading the price is 
determined by the market. 
The carbon trade is an idea that came about in response to 
the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is an agreement 
under which industrialized countries will reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions between the years 2008 to 2012 
to levels that are 5.2% lower than those of 1990.  
The idea behind carbon trading is quite similar to the 
trading of securities or commodities in a market place. 
Carbon would be given an economic value, allowing 
people, companies or nations to trade it. If a nation bought 
carbon, it would be buying the rights to burn it, and a nation 
selling carbon would be giving up its rights to burn it. The 
value of the carbon would be based on the ability of the 
country owning the carbon to store it or to prevent it from 
being released into the atmosphere. A market would be 
created to facilitate the buying and selling of the rights to 
emit greenhouse gases. The industrialized nations for which 
reducing emissions is a daunting task could buy the 
emission rights from another nation whose industries do not 
produce as much of these gases. The market for carbon is 
possible because the goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce 
emissions as a collective.  
On the one hand, the idea of carbon trade seems like a win-
win situation: greenhouse gas emissions may be reduced 
while some countries reap economic benefit. On the other 
hand, critics of the idea suspect that some countries will 
exploit the trading system and the consequences will be 
negative. While the proposal of carbon trade does have its 
merits, debate over this type of market is inevitable since it 
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involves finding a compromise between profit, equality and 
ecological concerns. 
The carbon market is one of the most effective policies for 
tackling climate change. It inspires operational excellence 
and incentivizes business investments in low-carbon 
technologies. Not only is the market expected to save over 2 
billion tones of CO2 emissions by the end of 2012, but the 
development of the current global carbon market, now 
worth over US$140 billion, has catapulted climate change 
to the forefront of business decisions. But while it exhibits 
real environmental and economic impact, and helps achieve 
climate change goals, it remains vulnerable to external 
factors. 
 
II. GLOBAL CARBON TRADING 
Emission trading is considered an important market-based 
instrument to control emissions and is an essential element 
of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) is the largest existing cap-and-trade 
system in the world and commenced operations in 2005. It 
covers about 2Gt of CO2 emissions at more than 10,000 
installations across the 27 EU member states. Following the 
EU ETS, an increasing number of world regions are 
currently introducing cap-and-trade systems that establish a 
price for greenhouse gas emissions. These include New 
Zealand, Australia, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) of ten US-States in northeastern USA, California, 
the Western Climate Initiative (eight US-State and two 
Canadian Provinces), and the Midwestern Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (nine US-States and one 
Canadian Province). In Japan, the cities of Tokyo and 
Hiroshima as well as the Kyoto prefecture intend to 
introduce mandatory emissions trading systems (Point 
Carbon, 2008). This development is underlined by the 
establishment of the International Carbon Action 
Partnership (ICAP) by several EU member states, the 
European Commission, California and other WCI members, 
several RGGI member states, New Zealand, and Japan (as 
an observer). ICAP sets up an expert forum to support the 
implementation and linking of emissions trading systems 
(ETS). 
The Doha climate summit was no landmark event, but 
governments adopted an extension of the 
Kyoto Protocol, set milestones in the lead up to a 2015 
agreement. The most significant outcome from Doha was 
the adoption of the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Europe and a handful of others, amounting to less 
than 15% of global emissions, effectively put their existing 
national targets under the Kyoto framework. In doing so, 
they maintain the institutions and mechanisms established 
by the Protocol through to the end of 2020. However, only 
those developed countries which have taken on KP2 targets 
are eligible to use credits from Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects after 2012. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL CARBON ACTION 
PARTNERSHIP 
The International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) 
constitutes an expert forum that explores design issues and 
linkages of regional emissions trading systems. ICAP 
investigates the relevant issues and proposes solutions 
where barriers are identified. The work of ICAP focuses on 
the three pillars of technical dialogue, ETS knowledge 
sharing and capacity building activities. ICAP’s objectives 
are:  
o Share best practices and learning from each other’s 
experience of ETS 
o Help policymakers recognize ETS design 
compatibility issues and opportunities for the 
establishment of an ETS at an early stage  
o Facilitate future linking of trading programs  
o Highlight the key role of emissions trading as an 
effective climate policy response 
o Build and strengthen partnerships amongst 
governments 
 The ‘ICAP Political Declaration’ (ICAP, 2007) states: 
“The International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) will 
create an international forum of governments and public 
authorities that are engaged in the process of designing or 
implementing carbon markets. ICAP will establish an 
expert forum to discuss relevant questions on the design, 
compatibility and potential linkage of regional carbon 
markets. The forum will convene regularly and define a 
work program, including joint research and studies. It will 
identify barriers, including barriers posed by applicable 
state, federal and national laws, and it will identify solutions 
with the view to developing recommendations for 
consideration by each of the signatories hereto. ICAP aims 
to support the United Nations process on climate change by 
facilitating working relationships among governments and 
public authorities engaged in developing and implementing 
programs to combat climate change.” 
In particular, in the formal linking scenario ICAP could 
evolve to become the international clearinghouse for a 
carbon market established by linking domestic ETS.In order 
to deal with the uncertainty on the evolution of carbon 
markets and thus the future role of ICAP identifies critical 
design issues that are relevant in the global trading, formal 
linking, mixed approach and indirect linking scenario, 
respectively. 
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IV. MECHANISM OF TRADING  
1. Global trading 
A global emissions trading system building on the Kyoto 
approach can be established from the top-down as follows: 
an international treaty establishes national emission targets 
for all Annex-I (and possible other) countries for specified 
periods post-2012. From an economic point of view a 
global trading system is a first-best policy instrument that 
will ensure that the costs of achieving given reduction 
targets are minimized. Within this overarching framework, 
governments can devolve responsibility for allowance 
trading to the private sector by establishing domestic ETS 
and linking these to the domestic ETS of other regions. 
Thus governments will only have to 
engage in international emissions trading on behalf of 
sectors that are not covered under a linked domestic ETS. 
2. Formal linking of domestic ETS 
If post-2012 negotiations within the UNFCCC do not lead 
to a global cap-and-trade consensus, nations and regions can 
establish domestic carbon markets and link these, thus 
constructing an international carbon market bottom-up 
(Tangen and Hasselknippe,  2005; Victor, 2007; Pizer, 
2007). A major advantage of this approach is that if no 
agreement on a global trading system is achieved within 
UNFCCC negotiations by 2009, linking offers an 
opportunity to keep and build political momentum for 
constructing a global carbon market in the mid- to long 
term. 
In principle, linking regional trading systems will enhance 
the efficiency of reduction efforts, increase liquidity of 
carbon markets, and reduce competitiveness concerns that 
could arise from different allowance price levels across 
systems (Edenhofer et al,2007). Unlike the global trading 
approach, however, the linking of regional trading systems 
does not allow controlling global emissions. Most of the 
issues arising when negotiating a global trading system 
remain important when linking bottom-up (e.g. defining a 
global policy target, and agreeing on burden sharing rules). 
However, these issues are negotiated only between the 
linking partners. Again, developing countries can 
participate in international emissions trading through credit 
schemes. 
3. Indirect linking 
Even if there is no agreement on formally linking regional 
emissions trading schemes, there will still be indirect 
linkages if national and regional domestic ETS accept 
credits from the same credit schemes like CDM. There will 
be some convergence in ETS price levels due to indirect 
linking. The levels of price convergence will depend on the 
supply curve of credits, import restrictions for credits, 
marginal abatements cost (MAC) curves and cap levels in 
the regional 
ETS. However, this mechanism cannot guarantee that 
allowance prices across domestic ETS are completely 
equalized. More specifically, the degree of convergence of 
ETS allowance prices should be higher, the larger the 
available amount of credits and the less restrictive the limits 
for the import of credits into the ETS. In the indirect linking 
scenario all ETS that enable the use of a certain credit type 
need to agree on its design features. This particularly 
concerns monitoring and verification and the additional 
requirements that ensure emission reductions take solely 
place 
due to the financing obtained from the credit scheme. 
4. Mixed approach 
Finally, mixed approach is conceivable containing elements 
of each of the stylized three approaches outlined above. If, 
for example, UNFCCC negotiations evolve towards 
agreement on a multilateral climate policy architecture by 
2009, but not all major emitters are willing to join a global 
cap-and-trade system immediately, the treaty may comprise 
a provision that enables reluctant countries or possibly 
subnational regions to join this scheme later. It is 
conceivable that the acceding regions would join the 
international trading system with their full economy or with 
some sectors only – that is, only their domestic ETS may be 
integrated into the global trading structure. It is also 
conceivable that developing countries gradually join such a 
trading system with specific sectors only, e.g. starting with 
the electricity sector. 
 
Clean Development Mechanism 
“Climate Change, Carbon markets and the CDM: A call to 
action” was released in September 2012. The report built 
the case for restoring faith in CDM, made 51 
recommendations for addressing the shortcoming of CDM, 
improving performance and responding to future challenges 
and opportunities to keep it relevant to mitigation efforts. It 
urged nations to intervene to address the crisis in the carbon 
market and substantially increase level of mitigation 
ambition. However, the report did not result into any action 
at the UNFCCC conference in Doha in December 2012. 
The UNFCCC secretariat also launched The CDM Loan 
Scheme in 2012 to boost CDM project development in 
LDCs. The Scheme provides interest-free loans for CDM 
projects in LDCs as well as countries that have fewer than 
10 registered CDM projects. The scheme is run jointly by 
the UNFCCC, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) Risoe Centre and the United Nations Office for 
Project Services (UNOPS). The loans are utilized to finance 
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the development of Project Design Documents (PDD), 
validation by a Designated Operational Entity (DOE), 
registration of the project with the UNFCCC and the 
monitoring and verification of Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs). In the first round of solicitation, the 
scheme received applications from 42 projects in 23 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and 
Africa with the majority of the applications coming from 
Africa (29). Regional CDM support centres as well as loans 
for project developers in underrepresented regions also do 
not change the broader picture. 
 
V. REDD+ AND CARBON MARKET 
The world’s forests are threatened by an ever-expanding 
demand for commodities such as soy, timber, palm oil and 
beef. Every year 13 million hectares of forests are being lost 
worldwide due to illegal or unsustainable logging and the 
conversion of forests to agricultural land. Emissions from 
forest degradation and deforestation account for 18% of 
global GHG emissions – 5.8 Gt CO2 – more than the 
emissions of all EU countries combined. But forests are 
crucial in the struggle for sustainable development. 
Proposals to finance REDD+ reach from scaling up public 
finance, for example through the Green Climate Fund to 
including REDD+ activities in international carbon markets. 
A large number of developing countries continue to stress 
that forest-related activities under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) must primarily 
be publicly funded. A little over ten years ago, forest 
conservation was excluded from the Clean Development 
Mechanism, and the EU decided to ban offset credits from 
forestry and land use land change activities (LULUCF) in 
the EU-ETS. There is an inherent high risk that forest offset 
credits do not represent real emission reductions due to 
leakage, the impermanence of forest carbon, inflated 
baselines, problematic additionality testing and difficult 
MRV. If these artificial credits would be traded in a global 
compliance market, global emissions would actually rise. 
However, offsetting is a zero sum game. Even if the credits 
would represent real emission reductions, allowing REDD 
projects in an offset mechanism would only shift emission 
reduction obligations from one country to the other and 
would not deliver the large long-term emission cuts 
required to stay below 2 degrees warming. Moreover, costs 
for the monitoring and implementation of forest carbon 
projects are high and fraudulent activities related to forest 
carbon trading have already been reported.  REDD+ 
emission credits must therefore not be included in a global 
compliance market. Alternative financing options exist and 
should be prioritized. These include for example a fund-
based approach, carbon taxes, levies on international 
aviation or maritime fuels and financial transaction taxes. A 
well designed REDD mechanism, in a larger mix of 
political instruments and financed outside of a compliance 
carbon market is an opportunity for the protection of forests 
and the biodiversity of forest ecosystems. However, forests 
play a vital part for biodiversity and forest-dependent 
communities around the globe. Therefore it is first and 
foremost essential that rights and livelihoods of forest 
dependent peoples are protected. Experience with 
afforestation and reforestation activities under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) has shown that impacts 
on forest peoples can be excessively negative. 
Displacements, land grabbing, restriction of traditional use 
of forests and other violations of indigenous peoples and 
forest dependent peoples have been reported.  The same 
issues have been reported with voluntary forest carbon 
activities such as REDD pilot projects and forest 
conservation projects. A robust and harmonized safeguard 
framework must therefore be put in place to enable the 
protection of forest livelihoods, uphold human rights and 
the conservation of biodiversity. There must be systematical 
monitoring, reporting and verification of safeguards. 
Information about these processes to forest dependent 
peoples must be scaled up considerably. 
 
VI. REDD+ AND CARBON MARKETS:TEN 
MYTHS EXPLODED 
Myth no. 1: ‘REDD+ represents a low-cost abatement 
option, enabling greater and faster emissions cuts than could 
be achieved for the same total costs with fossil fuel 
reductions alone. This is essential for stabilizing GHG 
concentrations at the scale and speed necessary to avoid the 
most catastrophic effects of climate change.’ 
Myth no. 2: ‘Estimates for the cost of cutting deforestation 
in half range from US $12 billion to US $35 billion per 
year. Raising this money will halve deforestation.’ 
Myth no. 3: ‘Carbon trading finance can play an especially 
important role for REDD+ in the long term by contributing 
sustainable funding efficiently and on the scale required.’ 
Myth no. 4: ‘Creating an economic value for standing 
forests will provide the necessary long-term economic 
incentives for effectively protecting tropical forests and 
reducing emissions from deforestation.’ 
Myth no. 5: ‘REDD+ is particularly well positioned to 
benefit from the policy shift from “project” to “sector wide” 
trading, given the suitability of forestry as a sector-wide 
mitigation effort.’ 
Myth no. 6: ‘Significant work has already been undertaken 
on REDD+ methodologies to ensure quality by 
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implementing rigorous measurement, reporting and 
verification requirements and determining reference levels 
which ensure additionality. As such, REDD+ is poised to be 
able to contribute rigorous, verifiable credits, fungible with 
emission reductions from other sources.’ 
Myth no. 7: ‘Concerns about the potential risk of REDD+ 
supply “flooding” the carbon market can be contained 
through policy and market design, including the adoption of 
strict long-term targets with “banking” and, if necessary, 
limits on the use of REDD+ and other types of credits.’ 
Myth no. 8: ‘For the period 2010–2012, developed 
countries committed US$4.5 billion for REDD+. The gap 
between this figure and the estimated annual financing 
needs for REDD+ is significant.’ 
Myth no. 9: ‘The US acid rain programme is an example of 
how cap-and-trade and market mechanisms can work to 
achieve environmental goals at least cost.’ 
Myth no. 10: ‘Concerns about additionality, non-
permanence and leakage, which initially kept forests out of 
carbon markets, have been addressed.’ 
 
VII. PARIS CONVENTION, CARBON TRADING 
AND REDD 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement states a new carbon trading 
mechanism. It manages to do so with mentioning the wind 
carbon or trading or market. Carbon offsets are 
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes. And the 
new carbon trading mechanism is a mechanism to 
contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions and support 
sustainable development. On 8th December,2015,Brazil and 
EU put forward a proposal on carbon market such as, “The 
EU and Brazil have agreed and submitted a ground breaking 
proposal on rules to governance  of the international carbon 
market at the UN climate talks in Paris. The joint proposal 
demonstrates a willingness to engage in common and robust 
rules on accounting for all parties.” The final rules of the 
new trading mechanism have not yet been agreed .It will 
only start in 2020 at the earliest. That means another five 
years of negotiating a new carbon market mechanism at the 
UNFCCC. Once the carbon trading mechanism kicks off, 
countries generating REDD credits will have no options.[i] 
Keep the REDD credit to offset the own emission from 
fossil fuels,[ii] Sell the REDD credits to countries that will 
use them to offset their emissions from fossil fuels. 
Neither of these options reduces global GHG emissions, 
because in both cases the reduction in emission from forests 
would be offset against continued emissions from fossil 
fuels. Rich countries may finance REDD if it creates a 
loopholes allowing them to continue burning fossil fuels. 
But it is difficult to see why they would want to finance 
REDD if it creates burning fossil fuels. At the start of 
COP21,Norway’s PM Erna Solberg announced that Norway 
wants to include REDD in carbon markets, so that in future 
Norway can claim to be carbon neutral. We need to 
dramatically reduce emissions from burning fossil fuels and 
from deforestation. We can not afford to trade off one 
against the other. Unfortunately, the Paris Agreement sets 
the stage for precisely that.   
 
VIII. CARBON MARKET POTENTIAL FOR 
INDIA IN 2020 
Government of India embarked upon its National Action 
Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) with 8 missions to 
ensure energy security, sustainable development, protection 
of bio-diversity and climate resilience in June 2008. These 
missions are: 
i. National Solar Mission 
ii. National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency 
iii. National Mission on Sustainable Habitat 
iv. National Water Mission 
v. National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan 
Ecosystem 
vi. National Mission for a “Green India” 
vii. National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture and 
viii. National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate 
Change. 
An expert group was constituted by the Planning 
Commission to develop a low carbon inclusive 
growth strategy for India’s Twelfth Five Year Plan. This 
Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive 
Growth in its interim report estimated the national 
emissions reduction potential by 2020 for various sectors 
under two scenarios namely 8% and 9% annual GDP 
growth. The sectors covered are power sector, transport, 
iron & steel, cement, oil & gas, buildings, waste 
management, other industries and households. The Expert 
Group has either not considered or considered very limited 
potential in the following sectors: energy distribution, 
chemical industries, fugitive emissions from production and 
consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, 
construction, solvent use, mining/mineral production and 
fugitive emissions from fuels (solid, oil and gas). These 
sectors have been excluded from the analysis. 
The regulatory framework, use of market mechanism and 
incentive mechanism (including price of emission 
reduction), will significantly influence carbon mitigation 
potential. This study examines the carbon market potential 
assuming CDM (or CDM like) framework in terms of 
baseline and crediting, additionality, etc. As the expert 
group has assumed a base year of 2007, the analysis has 
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first linearly apportioned the estimate to make 2012 as the 
base year. Two adjustments to account for the 
characteristics of the CDM were also made to the Expert 
Group’s analysis to quantify the Indian CDM potential in 
2020 (Table 1): 
Table.1: Estimated CDM potential in 2020 in million ton CO2 
 
As part of voluntary commitments, India has pledged 
reducing its emissions intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 
2020 in comparison to the 2005 level. Though restrictions 
around technologies (HFC23 and N2O abatement in adipic 
acid production) post true up period has no detrimental 
impact on the Indian supplies, yet the absence of demand 
for Indian projects registered after 31 December 2012 has 
resulted in reduced investment in several other 
sectors.Figure -1 shows the total investment into CDM 
projects for each state in the country. Industrialized states 
also have high renewable energy potential and this has lead 
to concentration of investments in the states of Gujarat, 
Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. 
Himachal Pradesh has benefited from large number of 
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hydro CDM projects, which is to be expected given its 
hydro potential, and Delhi because of transport CDM 
projects. High investment in Madhya Pradesh in on account 
of coal based supercritical power projects. Arunachal 
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Kerala and West Bengal have seen 
very limited investments into CDM. Biomass CDM projects 
in the sample are the most efficient job creator and create 
more than four times the average jobs (per rupee invested) 
across all project-types. Wind and hydro projects in the 
sample create relatively less employment per rupee invested 
as compared to EE own generation and EE industry projects 
during the construction phase. 
 
 
Fig.1:Statewise investment in CDM projects (Rs billion) 
 
Source: BMUB Global Carbon Market Project, New Delhi 
The Harnessing demand for Indian projects post-2012 are : 
1. Supporting projects through domestic emission 
trading scheme – 
2. Supporting projects through NCEF and CSR funds 
of large companies 
3. Developing standardized baselines 
4.  Developing sustainable development impact 
reporting 
5. 5.Evaluating and highlighting the benefits of CDM 
projects focusing on sustainable development 
Impacts 
6. 6. Constituting a high level Multi Stakeholder 
Advisory Group for Climate Change issues 
7. like Loss and Damage, Equity, Sustainable 
Development, Gender etc 
8. 7. Developing NAMAs 
9. 8. Developing the capacity for national emission 
reduction reporting and develop credible and robust 
reporting frameworks for corporate carbon 
reporting– 
But there are several causes of delays of maturing projects 
which are as follows: 
i. One of the major reasons for delays in registration of 
CDM projects is on account of lack of acceptable 
guidelines for setting benchmark, lack of 
institutional capacity, frequent revisions to CDM EB 
guidelines and lengthy validation cycle 
ii. The delay in registration of CDM projects was due 
to the increase in CDM projects from India and 
limited increase in the number of DOEs 
iii. The cement and energy efficiency project-types have 
higher rejection rate than hydro and wind project-
types 
iv. Projects in reforestation, EE household, EE in SME, 
off-grid solar and agriculture project-types face 
MRV, organizational and financial barriers. 
v. HFC 23, N2O and landfill gas(where these is no 
energy generation) projects risk closure post the 
withdrawal of market support and fall in CER prices 
vi. Goa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Kerala, Jammu & Kashmir, 
Haryana and North Eastern states have very limited 
development of CDM projects 
The promotion and development of the emission reduction 
projects will require a combination of the following 
measures: 
i. Demand-side measures: Given the weak demand for 
CERs and the uncertain time frame for new market 
mechanisms, all attempts should be made to revive 
demand in the existing regulatory framework, 
particularly for projects registered post 2012. 
ii. Improving sustainable development impacts: 
Improving the sustainable development impacts as 
well as improving communication on the outcomes / 
impacts of CDM project activities is required for 
stimulating demand of quality CDM projects and 
addressing international concerns. 
iii. Efficiency of registration: Once there is a revival of 
demand, measures should be undertaken to remove 
the barriers in CDM project registration while also 
improving sustainable development impacts. 
iv. Future regulatory mechanisms: Recognizing that 
CDM is likely to be transitory in nature and new 
market mechanisms are likely to be more prominent 
particularly in the post 2020 carbon markets, 
measures should be undertaken to develop synergies 
between CDM, NAMAs and other market 
mechanisms. 
v. Supply side measures: Once there is regulatory 
certainty and robust demand, supply side measures 
should be undertaken that encourage larger 
participation of industry in emerging global carbon / 
CDM market. 
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Therefore, the recommendations below are targeted 
towards: 
A. Harnessing demand for Indian projects post 2012; 
B. Achieving better sustainable development for CDM 
projects; 
C. Developing synergies between CDM, NAMAs and 
other market mechanisms; and 
D. Encouraging larger participation of industry in 
carbon market. 
 
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The international carbon market currently faces 
considerable uncertainties regarding its future architecture. 
There are a number of options for further development, 
including a global trading approach building on Kyoto, 
formal linkages of domestic ETS leading to a global CO2 
market, and indirect linkages through credits if domestic 
ETS remain otherwise unconnected. Also, a mixed 
approach is conceivable. Regions should share a common 
understanding on the overall 
climate policy goal (e.g., the 2°C target) as well as a 
burden-sharing rule translating into ETS caps. These two 
fundamental issues will crucially determine the level of 
ambition of an ETS as expressed in (a) the emission cap, 
which in combination with amount and costs of available 
abatement options of a region crucially determines the 
allowance price level; and (b) ETS design features also 
exerting influence on the allowance price level and 
environmental outcome. For a player with ambitious 
environmental targets it should be preferable to announce 
that it will link only under the condition that another system 
displays a similar level of ambition, thus using the 
efficiency and potential reputational benefits from linking 
as a bargaining chip. Linking to less ambitious regions 
would undermine the credibility of such announcements. 
Harmonization of trading systems should start as early as 
possible in order to enable the option of linking ETS post-
2012. For this purpose, ICAP could be a nucleus for such an 
international clearinghouse. 
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